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DIVERGENT STRATEGIES: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
WTO’S NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY, 1983-2019 
By: William J. Gardner, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
This student note provides a legal history of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) adjudication of “national security” disputes under 
Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
skeptical German historian Oswald Spengler noted, “History is direction—
but Nature is extension—ergo everyone gets eaten by a bear.” Tracing the 
history of landmark GATT and WTO decisions from the 1983 US—Trade 
Measures Affecting Nicaragua case, this note weaves through the WTO’s 
relatively consistent reluctance to engage in domestic policy, detailing the 
WTO’s massive deviation from that policy in the 2019 Russia—Measures 
Concerning Traffic in Transit case. In doing so, this note presents a 
comprehensive history of the GATT and the WTO, while describing the 
fundamental themes of conflict presented throughout the WTO’s relatively 
short history, especially in the context of the national security exception. 
Those themes, namely the so-called “shock of the global” and globalization, 
and the WTO’s struggle to reconcile domestic and international interests, 
permeate throughout the history of the GATT and the WTO. In effect, this 
paper details the WTO’s challenges with national security and domestic 
affairs, which some speculate might lead to a self-cannibalization of the WTO, 
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“History is direction—but Nature is extension—ergo everyone gets 
eaten by a bear.” 
-Oswald Spengler 
 
“The nation will continue to be a central pole of identification, even if 
more and more nations come to share common economic and 
political forms of organization.” 
-Francis Fukayama 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, thirty-six years of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) Appellate Body’s jurisprudence evaporated with the stroke 
of a pen. From 1983-2019, the WTO Appellate Body recognized 
national sovereignty as a principal beyond its reach; Wilsonian self-
determination guided Appellate Body decisions such that nationalistic 
security considerations counter-balanced—and arguably 
outweighed—standard tariff considerations.1 The lingering specter of 
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provided, 
in Article XXI, an “exception” to the WTO’s otherwise globalized 
interest. The following provision, Article XXI, embodied the essence of 
early twentieth century views on self-determination; by 2019, it 
became clear that Wilsonian self-determination seemed incompatible 
with larger, globalized marketplaces, which require free trade—with 
few to no nationalistic tariffs—in order to operate properly.2 
Article XXI 
Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any 
information the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to its essential security interests; or 
 
1 See Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Fourteen Points 
Address) (1918), in 45 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 534, 539 (Arthur S. Link 
ed., 1984). For the sake of simplicity, the references to Wilsonian self-determination 
serve as a guiding instrument to explain the GATT 1947’s interests: ensuring that 
supranational trade not interfere with otherwise strictly national interests. “Wilsonian 
self-determination” refers to the President’s plea for nationalistic autocracy in the 
international system, highlighted in the Fourteen Points speech. Id.; see also Report 
by the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 5.1-.17, L/6053 
(Oct. 13, 1986), http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.pdf 
[hereinafter Nicaragua Panel Report]. 
2 See Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
697 (2011). Though Alford’s work focuses more on the self-judging nature of the 
national security exception, he contextualizes the conflict between supra-national and 
national intentions—a key theme in the comparison of the national security exception 
to Wilsonian self-determination drawn by this paper. It is also logical to attribute the 
national security exception to Wilsonian idealisms, being that early trade views were 
formed by post-World War I era international skepticism. 
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(b)  to prevent any contracting party from taking 
any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests 
(i)  relating to fissionable materials or the 
materials from which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for 
the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii)  taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking 
any action in pursuance of its obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.3 
Of note—and quite unique to Article XXI—is that the national 
security exception applies to situations wherein the contracting party 
has the right to judge its own essential security interests.4 Noting the 
vague definition of “security interests,” it is important to again 
contextualize this exemption as quite contrary to international 
comity.5 Though the national security exception is a clear attempt to 
balance international trade with domestic considerations, many fear 
the ambiguity surrounding Article XXI’s language allows countries to 
essentially “opt-out” of international free trade agreements for the 
sake of national security.6 
 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant 
Failure?, 52 DUKE L. J. 1277, 1278 (2003). 
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE WTO NATIONAL SECURITY 
EXCEPTION, ITS PROBLEMS, AND THE CRISIS OF THE 
PRESENT DAY 
Article XXI ensured each nation certain “national security” 
rights, wherein the WTO could not act “to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests.”7 In effect, GATT 1947 
limited the WTO’s global mission from the outset—in theory, nations 
could circumvent Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) trade principles by 
claiming breach of their national security interests, thereby placing 
tariffs as they pleased and not necessarily to the benefit of the 
international community. 
However, the WTO’s history seems to suggest such a fatal flaw 
ought not otherwise exist. In 1944, the Allied powers, meeting at the 
Bretton Woods Conference, crafted the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and GATT 1947.8 Spearheaded by the United States, 
which moved away from its historically isolationist policies because it 
could now afford freer trade, GATT 1947 culminated in eight rounds, 
each of which attempted to reduce tariff levels and increase trade 
between nations.9 GATT 1947 and its architects recognized a strikingly 
modern trade theory—Less Developed Countries (“LDCs”) required 
trade, and the United States’ goal of “communist containment” would 
only be furthered if democracy, industrialization, and prosperity took 
hold in these countries.10 
After eight successful rounds, in 1994, the Uruguay Round 
culminated in the creation of the WTO under the guise of GATT 1994.11 
Importantly, GATT 1994 incorporates the entirety of GATT 1947, but 
provisions the creation of the WTO under these former Bretton Woods 
 
7 GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI(b). 
8 WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL, US TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 4 
(2d ed. 2004). 
9 Id. 
10 See generally X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566-582 (1947); 
see also Lovett, supra note 8, at 4. 
11 Lovett, supra note 8, at 10. 
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principles.12 The GATT Secretariat expanded from a rounds-based 
regime to a continuing multinational organization.13 Voting in the 
WTO shifted toward simple majority, with each country receiving one 
vote, as in the United Nations General Assembly.14 In addition, GATT 
1994 created the WTO dispute settlement panel system, whereby 
countries that feel disfavored can counter tariff processes they feel are 
contrary to their interests by convening a panel to challenge the 
tariffs.15 Importantly, however, decisions upheld by the WTO’s 
Appellate Body—a seven-member “court”—cannot be overturned 
except by a negative consensus; that is, all countries that win would 
have to support their victory being overturned in such a system.16 
Therefore, as no rational actor would support the reversal of a decision 
in their favor, WTO panel decisions are all but impossible to overturn. 
Having dispensed with the relevant background, this Note 
traces the legal history of the WTO national security exception, 
beginning with the 1983 United States—Trade Measures Affecting 
Nicaragua case and ending with the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic 
in Transit case, noting the massive impacts on the disparate results 
between these two cases on pending dispute settlements. It will 
elucidate on four main themes: (1) the “shock of the global” and 
reconciling national interests with the globalized system of trade; (2) 
the recurrence of the idea that the WTO is full of incongruous goals, 
most importantly, reconciling national security exceptions with comity 
in international trade; (3) the WTO’s failure to determine whether the 
national security exception is “self-judging”; and (4) the drastic shift 
from 1983 to now as part of a larger history of globalization, focusing 
on this context as shaping the development of international trade law. 
This Note is an intellectual history. It will consider the now 
uncertain future created by the four aforementioned thematic 
undertones in the broader context of WTO dispute settlement issues 
promulgated by the national security exception to GATT 1947. 
 
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
13 Lovett, supra note 8, at 10. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 10-11. 
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Importantly, one such example of looming uncertainty in WTO 
jurisprudence exists in the Qatar and UAE dispute over “measures 
taken in the context of coercive attempts at economic isolation” 
allegedly imposed by the UAE upon Qatar.17 Most drastic, however, 
are the implications for Section 232 tariffs imposed by the United 
States. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 enables U.S. 
Presidents to unilaterally install tariffs under the guise of a domestic 
national security exception, mirroring Article XXI of GATT 1947.18 
Though Section 232 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were created 
for the Kennedy Round, wherein the United States slashed tariffs by 
roughly fifty percent, the legislation cuts both ways, allowing drastic 
restrictions of trade with little oversight. Due to President Trump 
installing tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles under Section 
232, eight countries, as well as the European Union, have initiated 
WTO dispute resolution panels against the United States: China, India, 
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey.19 As a 
result, now, more than ever, the clouded and muddled jurisprudence 
of the WTO regarding GATT’s Article XXI and the national security 
exception is vital to the interests of the global community. 
Much of the existing scholarship on the legal history of the 
United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua case and the Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case eschews notions of a 
continuing legal history in favor of discrete analyses. Simon Lester and 
Huan Zhu’s A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National Security” 
Trade Restrictions notes the US-Nicaragua case and its place in a broader 
history, but does not describe that history, instead focusing on an 
 
17 See Tania Voon, The Security Exception in WTO Law: Entering into a New Era, 
113 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 46 (2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-
cambridge-core/content/view/CF8C3DCDF2CD924CAEEDD147840668F9/S23987
72319000035a.pdf/security_exception_in_wto_law_entering_a_new_era.pdf; WTO, 
Qatar Seeks WTO Panel Review of UAE Measures on Goods, Services, IP Rights, 
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dsb_23oct17_e.htm. 
18 Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44707, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY 
OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS AND DUTIES 1 (2016). 
19 See Voon, supra note 17, at 47. For further information regarding the domestic 
implications of President Trump’s actions, which will not be the focus of this note, 
see Joshua Jamerson, Congress Mulls Curbing Presidential Trade Authority, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-mulls-
curbing-presidential-trade-authority-11550152801. 
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active proposal for the re-shaping of US domestic policy in light of the 
2019 Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit decision.20 Roger P. 
Alford provided perhaps the most comprehensive legal history of the 
WTO’s national security exception, however, his article The Self-
Judging WTO National Security Exception is now dated, originating in 
2011; yet, it remains one of the most complete and impressive legal 
histories on the pre-2019 status quo ante of the WTO and GATT Article 
XXI decisions.21 In Petrificus Totalus: The Spell of National Security!, R. V. 
Anuradha provides a complete list of the historical and contemporary 
national security dispute cases facing the WTO.22 Interestingly, 
Anuradha’s documentation of these cases eschews historical analysis 
for a broader study of the national security exception itself; instead of 
explaining the contemporary issues regarding the ongoing trade wars, 
it contextualizes the GATT’s development over time.23 In National 
Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision or Reconciliation?, J. 
Benton Heath, provides a thematic account of the collision between 
international and national trade policies, particularly in the history of 
GATT Article XXI.24 Yet, Heath’s paper is not a history like this note; 
it is a thematic overview, describing the tensions between the national 
and the international, but not discussing and detailing the mechanisms 
and context in play throughout the thirty-six year history of GATT 
Article XXI.25 The literature on the legal history of the WTO’s decisions 
from the 1983 US-Nicaragua dispute to the 2019 Russia-Ukraine dispute 
insufficiently describes these events, claiming them to be separate and 
distinct, rather than, as this student note argues, part of a larger 
continuum. 
The final—and integral—theme of this paper is the cyclical 
nature of the underlying legal history, such that the WTO seems to be 
moving away from the toleration of “isolationist” policies such as the 
Article XXI national security exception and toward a global, 
 
20 Simon Lester and Huan Zhu, A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National 
Security” Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451 (2019). 
21 Alford, supra note 2. 
22 R. V. Anuradha, Petrificus Totalus: The Spell of National Security!, 13 ASIAN J. 
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 311 (2018). 
23 Id. 
24 J. Benton Heath, National Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision 
or Reconciliation?, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1431 (2019). 
25 Id. 
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internationalized, and modern system of free trade based on 
international comity. Interestingly, this system seemed present at the 
time of the GATT’s inception, yet yielded to international skepticism, 
an operational guideline for most trading countries during the pre-
World War I era.26 
III.  GATT—FOUNDING A NEW WORLD, 1947 
As GATT grew out of the Bretton Woods framework and 
evolved into a mature international organization, its members met in 
a series of “rounds,” each designed to further international comity in 
commerce and trade. GATT concluded a series of eight rounds, not 
counting the initial round in Geneva: Annecy, Torquay, Geneva II, 
Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay, and Doha. Though some of the 
early rounds—namely the Annecy and Torquay rounds—proceeded 
with the intention of establishing GATT as an international governing 
body, as well as developing GATT’s institutional framework, each of 
the eight rounds shared one commonality: tariff reduction.27 
Importantly, GATT’s designers intended its use for trade 
liberalization and freedom, not protectionism and isolation. Though 
provisions such as the aforementioned Article XXI national security 
exception existed at the time of GATT’s adoption, the main intention 
of GATT was the systematic lowering—and eventual erasure—of 
international tariffs.28 In its preamble, GATT recognized that reforms 
post-war had to favor market liberalization; GATT operated under the 
presumption that higher living standards would ensue internationally 
if market access increased while trade costs contemporaneously 
decreased.29 
Market liberalization starkly contrasted with pre-World War I 
attitudes, which favored nationalistic market independence and heavy 
tariffs in order to support domestic economies and production. Two 
 
26 SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY, THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR 4 (photo. reprt. 1948) 
(2nd ed.). 
27 See Timeline: World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2430089.stm. 
28 ANTHONY M. ENDRES & GRANT A. FLEMING, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1919-1950 131 (2002). 
29 GATT, supra note 3, art. VII. 
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economists’ ideas stand pronounced in early GATT liberalization 
principles: the Swedish economist Folke Hilgerdt and the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes. 
Hilgerdt’s early work suggested freer trade in the 1930s would 
have reduced the depth of the worldwide impact of the Great 
Depression because it would have dampened inflation pressures in the 
larger, relatively closed economies.30 In other words, liberal trade 
would have stymied the spread of the Great Depression’s disastrous 
downturn because closed national markets would not have faced such 
heavy inflation, due to the countervailing force of global, liberal 
trade.31 Modeling the aforementioned then-experimental liberal trade 
network, in 1938, Hilgerdt demonstrated considerable trade 
integration despite the rise of protectionism in the 1930s; also, his 
models indicated the potential for greater multilateral trade, but only 
if trade were substantially liberalized and tariffs accordingly 
reduced.32 
Keynes’ famous works, including the General Theory, did not 
hold sway in the early Geneva round of GATT.33 Though neither the 
early GATT rounds cited the General Theory, nor did they attribute their 
ideas to Keynes in any official regard, a general “Keynesian” idea that 
aggregate demand could be managed by monetary and fiscal policy 
seemed to predominate.34 By promoting microeconomic 
liberalization—that is, liberalization of trade at the national scale—
through freer trade, GATT seemingly relied upon and employed the 
ideas of Keynes’ work.35 The Geneva round’s initial research program 
derived much of its ideals from Scandinavian-style international 
economics, which ultimately proved pivotal in the installment of this 
Keynesian-esque system.36 Clearly, the then-liberal ideas of free trade 
pronounced by Hilgerdt, Keynes, and their contemporaries 
 
30 Endres & Fleming, supra note 28, at 131. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.; see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY, 1936. 
34 Endres & Fleming, supra note 28, at 132. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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manifested in the GATT, whether or not the 1947 agreement explicitly 
attributed its ideals to their works. 
A. The Subcutaneous Emergence of the WTO, 1994 
After nearly fifty years of successful trade liberalization 
measures, GATT folded into a permanent international body—the 
WTO. By “the early 1980s, the United States suggested a broader 
GATT round to include services and agriculture, and to open more 
NIC [‘Newly Industrialized Country’] and LDC [‘Less Developed 
Country’] markets.”37 Countervailing forces—namely in the form of 
rising protectionist interests—threatened international comity in 
trade; a “consensus” of sorts soon emerged—a broad Uruguay GATT 
round was necessary to combat a potential bifurcation in the fragile 
international system established in 1947.38 However, another threat to 
the international system emerged, placing the Uruguay round’s 
ambitions in doubt. The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
sought perestroika and glasnost, effectively reforming the country, and 
opening its manufacturing capacities to widespread international 
trade. The EU, in the meanwhile, resisted international liberalization 
of agricultural trade.39 Finally, Americans felt—likely due to the 
aforementioned pressures on the GATT system—a “more level 
playing field was essential.”40 
These potentially bifurcating tensions resolved with the 
creation of the WTO. An international body providing equal votes and 
a dispute resolutions process based on the same goals as GATT 1947, 
the WTO seemed poised to cure the ailing GATT system.41 The United 
States viewed these aforementioned features, particularly the 
equitable voting system, as highly controversial.42 Like the United 
Nations, each member country of the WTO would receive one vote, 
with all votes weighed equally among the member states.43 In effect, 
 





42 Lovett, supra note 8, at 8-11. 
43 Id. 
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developing countries possess some three-quarters of the votes in the 
WTO. Compared with the International Monetary Fund, which has 
weighted voting according to financial quotas and economic strength, 
the WTO provided an arguably less-than-ideal voting system for 
satisfying the GATT’s purposes of a level playing field.44 
Most controversial to the United States and other founding 
members, however, was the WTO’s Appellate Body system.45 Panel 
decisions are appealable to the Appellate Body, a seven-member court, 
for the purposes of review.46 However, Appellate Body decisions 
cannot be overturned except by the unanimous vote of all WTO 
member states.47 From a matter of practicality, any nation that has won 
an appeal in their favor after appearing before the Appellate Body has 
no logical reason to then cast a vote to overturn the favorable decision. 
Effectively, the negative consensus requirement means that WTO 
Appellate Body decisions are nearly de facto and cannot be 
overturned.48 
Importantly, though the WTO provides access to dispute 
resolution panels, its appeals process is relatively limited. As such, 
decisions of the WTO Appellate Body can reshape interpretations of 
GATT 1947, without room for further appeal. The powerful 
precedential-overriding power of the Appellate Body ensures 
decisions once understood as the final manifestation of GATT’s 
national security exception, for example the holding in the US—
Nicaragua dispute, can be summarily overturned years later, as was the 
case in the Russia—Ukraine decision. 
IV. US—NICARAGUA: THE PRECARIOUS ORIGINS OF A 
“SELF-JUDGING” ARTICLE XXI NATIONAL SECURITY 
EXCEPTION 
On May 1, 1985, then-President Ronald Reagan issued 
Executive Order 12513 prohibiting the majority of trade with 
Nicaragua and restricting all transactions related to certain forms of air 
 
44 Id. at 10. 
45 Id. at 10-11. 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 Lovett, supra note 8, at 11. 
48 See id. 
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and sea transportation between Nicaragua and the United States.49 
Nicaragua, dissatisfied with President Reagan’s actions, called for 
panel review by the GATT with the intent of examining the measures 
imposed by the United States in light of Article XXI.50 The United 
States subsequently rejected to the establishment of a panel, citing 
GATT Article XXI as justification for the sanctions. The United States’ 
national security interests, according to the United States 
representative, fell within the domain of domestic governance, not the 
GATT’s Council.51 “A panel could [] not address the validity of, nor 
the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of Article XXI.”52 The 
United States additionally noted the futility of Nicaragua’s qualm, 
noting any panel recommendation made would inherently rely upon 
a limited frame of reference—United States and Nicaragua-centric 
domestic law—and therefore could not apply on a broader scale.53 
The Nicaraguan theory of Article XXI’s application relied on 
two distinct conditions: (1) the measures taken by the United States—
or any other Article XXI action taken by another power—had to be 
necessary for the protection of an essential security interest; and (2) the 
measure had to be taken in a time of war or other emergency in 
international relations.54 In effect, Nicaragua advocated that Article 
XXI should be interpreted as a self-defense law; that is, in order for one 
power to effectuate national security tariffs, they would have to be 
attacked or otherwise somehow have their national security impacted 
by some other nation. 
Interestingly, the Panel had little discussion regarding the 
purposes of the United States and its counter-arguments; contextual 
analysis provides that the United States perhaps was arguing Article 
XXI’s national security was an assurance of a sovereign right, outside 
the realm of any international body. Historian Geoffrey Blainey, in The 
Causes of War, notes that international prosperity is not always an 
effective deterrent to war.55 Using World War I as a case study, Blainey 
 
49 Exec. Order No. 12513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1985). 




54 Id. at 8. 
55 See generally GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR (1973). 
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describes the failure of peace despite increasing trade, tourism, and 
growing global multiculturalism.56 In a similar vein, the United States 
responded to the aforementioned Nicaraguan assertion regarding 
Article XXI with a dismissive indifference, stating that “Article XXI 
applied to any action which the contracting party taking it considered 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interest.”57 
Similarly to the thesis in Blainey’s work, the United States argued 
Article XXI inherently could not be for war deterrent purposes. 
Though the Nicaraguan government claimed that war could be 
deterred through the functioning of the GATT—by increasing trade 
and trade access—the United States supposed through its argument 
that the GATT functioned less for the purposes of peace and more for 
the purposes of financial growth. 
Despite American protestations, in a separate review of the 
issues at bar, the International Court of Justice found that embargoing 
Nicaragua was one of a series of economic and military actions taken 
against Nicaragua in violation of international law. 58 The GATT 
Council noted the International Court of Justice’s holding that the 
embargoes were not necessary for the protection of any essential 
security interest of the United States.59 The United States replied to the 
International Court of Justice and the panel with a simple argument—
Article XXI applied to “any action which the contracting party taking 
it considered necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interest.”60 Using direct language from the GATT 1947, the United 
States highlighted an inherently self-interested application of the law: 
the national security exception applied in situations where a country 
was acting in order to protect its own national security. In other words, 
the best judge of a nation’s national security, then, was that nation 
itself. 
Adjudicating this dispute, the GATT Council relied upon the 
following limited terms of reference: 
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To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT 
provisions, of the understanding reached at the 
Council on 10 October 1985 that the Panel cannot 
examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the 
invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii)[sic] by the United 
States, of the relevant provisions of the Understanding 
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/211-218), and 
of the agreed Dispute Settlement Procedures contained 
in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (BISD29S/13-16), 
the measures taken by the United States on 7 May 1985 
and their trade effects in order to establish to what 
extent benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the 
General Agreement have been nullified or impaired, 
and to make such findings as will assist the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES in further action in this 
matter.61 
The Panel report made clear that “the Panel could not examine 
the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of 
Article XXI.”62 The aforementioned terms of reference explicitly state 
the Panel “cannot examine or judge the validity of or motivation for 
the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii)[sic].”63 Prematurely having its legs 
swept from below, the Panel therefore could not actually reach a ruling 
on the Article XXI invocation. As some measure of guidance, in dicta, 
the Panel “concluded that embargoes such as the one imposed by the 
United States, independent of whether or not they were justified under 
Article XXI, ran counter to basic aims of the GATT . . . .”64 However, 
the Panel’s ultimate conclusion seemingly left Article XXI matters in 
the hands of sovereign nations for them to articulate and manage, 
whether or not such actions were actually valid under Article XXI. 
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A. “Freedom is Under Siege”—Contextualization and 
Explanation of the United States’ Argument Before 
the GATT Council Under President Reagan 
President Reagan, in his 1985 State of the Union address, laid 
the ground for the aforementioned executive order that the 
Nicaraguan government protested before the GATT Council and, in 
doing so, created the so-called “Reagan Doctrine.”65 President Reagan 
stated “[w]e cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not 
innocent; nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege . . . 
Support for freedom fighters is self-defense . . . It is essential that the 
Congress continue all facets of our assistance to Central America.”66 
Later that May, the President signed the fateful and above-mentioned 
Executive Order 12513; an estimated $169 million in bilateral trade 
evaporated with the stroke of a pen, justified by supposed threats to 
the United States’ national security.67 
At discussion before the GATT Council, nineteen of the forty-
three nations present argued that Article XXI was self-judging; nine 
argued that it was not; and fifteen expressed no opinion.68 A clear 
majority of the Member states felt, then, that national security interests 
lay in the hands of each nation individually; that the GATT could not 
intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign powers; and that, with 
regards to maintaining international comity in trade, GATT’s powers 
should be strictly limited to the supra-national. Nicaragua poignantly 
argued strongly against a self-judging Article XXI, suggesting the 
absurdity of claiming that “Nicaragua, a small and undeveloped 
country, could pose a threat to the national security of one of the most 
powerful countries in the world.”69 India, agreeing, suggested need for 
proving a “genuine nexus” between security interests and “trade 
action taken.”70 Cuba added “it was a mockery . . . for such a powerful 
country to cite Article XXI as a basis for imposing economic sanctions 
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on a small, poor country that could not possibly threaten U.S. 
security.”71 Poland and Czechoslovakia joined the Nicaraguan side, 
addressing fears over power imbalances and pointing out that Article 
XXI could easily be invoked by stronger powers to essentially impose 
upon smaller countries “discriminatory, unilateral and arbitrary 
actions.”72 In other words, a self-judging national security interest is 
structured such that justifications are not required. The actions of the 
United States—a major hegemon—in claiming that a significantly 
smaller and weaker Nicaragua posed a threat to American national 
security demonstrated to Nicaragua, India, Cuba, and their other six 
fellow Member states a clear hypocrisy lying dormant in the GATT 
system. 
By the end of Nicaragua’s plea for review, the GATT Council 
found for the United States, affirming the idea that Article XXI was, in 
effect, self-judging. Harkening back to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the 
GATT Council recognized national sovereignty and the right to self-
governance, but at a cost. The only extant international body of trade 
failed to plug a major hole in its system. Until 2019, the United States—
Nicaragua conflict remained binding, such that even after the formation 
of the WTO, Article XXI actions proceeded with an emphasis on 
domestic non-intervention.73 
V. THE PRESENT DAY: RUSSIA-MEASURES CONCERNING 
TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT 
A. The Russia-Ukraine Dispute in Context 
Much of the world has been watching the Russian military 
intervention in Ukraine with a keen eye. Since February 2014, Russian 
military forces have occupied—and effectively annexed—parts of the 
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a localized and miniaturized war, the Ukrainian government has 
attempted to reclaim the Crimea; throughout the Spring of 2014, 
Russian troops invaded the region, seizing key facilities, attempting to 
reclaim the Crimea as part of Russia.75 The Russian government—
under the direction of Vladimir Putin—initially denied that the 
soldiers wearing Russian combat fatigues, utilizing Russian 
weaponry, and equipped with Russian tactical equipment were at all 
committing actions sanctioned by the Russian government.76 That is 
until April of 2014, when President Putin confirmed the troops were 
indeed Russian, committing actions sanctioned by the Russian 
government.77 In a highly controversial election, the Crimean 
government—essentially a puppet controlled by the Russian regime—
voted “Soviet-style” to join Russia; a 97% “yes” vote with 83% turnout 
forever changed Ukraine’s governance in the twenty-first century.78 
Reasons for the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent 
military occupation of eastern Ukraine are historical and myriad. 
Catherine the Great annexed the region in 1783, where it remained 
under Russian—and subsequently Soviet—control until 1954, when it 
was transferred to the Soviet Bloc-run Ukrainian government.79 Even 
still, Russian motives for intervening and interfering with the 
autonomous post-Soviet Ukraine seem to echo the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
Espoused in 1968, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev declared the 
need for the then-Soviet Union to intervene in the then-Soviet Bloc 
states, in order to maintain a Marxist-Leninist status quo.80 Effectively, 
then, the Soviet government announced its right to intervene militarily 
in any Eastern Bloc nation it felt necessary. In the twenty-first century, 
Vladimir Putin has espoused much the same, justifying his actions as 
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B. Russia—Ukraine: The Economic Crisis and the 
Entrance of the WTO 
At a surface level, in contrast to the United States and 
Nicaragua, the Russia—Ukraine dispute hinges more-so on hard 
military power than economic sanctions. While the United States was 
actively engaged in the Falklands War, as well as the Iran-Contra 
affair, its hard power presence in the contested region pales in 
comparison to the literal boots-on-the-ground insurgency serving as 
the background to the Russia—Ukraine dispute. 
Russia imposed transit restrictions on Ukrainian territory in 
January 2016, cutting off access to Central Asian and Caucasian 
markets.82 Under normal circumstances, access to these markets are 
provided by means of Russian roadways and rail systems.83 Ukraine, 
economically impacted by these actions (for clear reasons, given that 
major markets evaporated overnight due to the ongoing Russian 
insurgency), petitioned the WTO, stating that “the Russian Federation 
. . . adopted and applied various [damaging] measures concerning 
traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine . . . through the territory 
of the Russian Federation to third countries by means of road and rail 
transportation.”84 Russia’s answer and defense to the complaint was 
simple: Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1947 states economic 
restrictions “taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations” justified their implementation of constraints on Ukrainian 
exports.85 Again, the WTO faced a potential calamity. The age-old 
question of national sovereignty and the WTO’s level of review of such 
matters stood before the WTO—a specter of the past, haunting the 
present, and threatening to disrupt order. 
Before proceeding further in the discussion of the Russia—
Ukraine crisis, it is important to digress and mention that Russia and 
Ukraine are, as aforementioned, technically at war. Historians, policy 
strategists, and scholars alike have interchangeably used the term 
“Russo—Ukrainian War” to describe Russo—Ukrainian relations 
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since 2014.86 Therefore, by all measures of technical accuracy and 
precision, it is not incorrect for the Russian Federation to state that it is 
at war with Ukraine and, because of that war, subsection (b)(iii) of 
Article XXI of the GATT 1947 ensures Russia the right to unilaterally 
cease trade and implement restrictions on the basis of national 
security.87 The United States, acting as a third-party, submitted a letter 
addressed to the Panel.88 In that letter, the United States agreed with 
Russia, arguing that the WTO Panel ought to limit its frame of 
reference to the strict verbiage of the GATT and recognize—from a 
textualist standard—that Article XXI has been invoked.89 The 
European Union submitted a letter itself, also acting as a third-party.90 
In contrast to the United States, the European Union argued that 
Article XXI invocations are justiciable; that is, Article XXI’s scope can 
be determined—and therefore limited or expanded—by the WTO 
Panel.91 
As to the United States’ position in its letter, there is one major 
factor driving the United States’ continued defense of Article XXI. 
Aside from the United States’ history with the 1983 Nicaragua 
decision, the United States currently faces numerous disputes—each 
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brought before the WTO, and all in reference to Section 232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 Tariffs function as a domestic 
counterpart to Article XXI, in that they allow the President of the 
United States to impose “national security” tariffs in times where the 
security of the nation is threatened.92 Rather unsurprisingly, the 
vagueness of Section 232—just like the vagueness of Article XXI—has 
proven problematic, providing myriad issues to the United States 
government and the world economy.93 Section 232 tariffs have not 
been used by any president after the 1995 creation of the WTO and 
prior to President Trump. President Trump, however, has utilized 
them liberally in his escalating trade war with China; the United States 
has put Section 232 tariffs on aluminum, steel, and uranium, in return, 
China, Russia, Turkey, and other nations impacted by the tariffs 
brought their grievances to the WTO.94 As such, the United States has 
maintained its historical position that invoking Article XXI is a “self-
judging” action—as it set forth in the 1983 Nicaragua dispute—and 
thus the United States forwarded the aforementioned letter to the 
WTO, siding with Russia and suggesting the self-judging nature of 
Article XXI actions.95 
C. Zero Hour: The WTO Panel’s Decision 
In a drastic shift from the proceeding seventy-two years of 
international economic decision-making under the GATT 1947, the 
WTO Panel found that the WTO “has jurisdiction to determine 
whether the requirements of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 are 
satisfied,” upon any invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii).96 The panel 
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operated under terms of reference far different from those of the 1983 
GATT Council for the United States—Nicaragua dispute: 
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of 
the covered agreements cited by the parties to the 
dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Ukraine in 
document WT/DS512/3 and to make such findings as 
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or 
in giving the rulings provided for in those 
agreements.97 
These terms are far broader than the aforementioned limited 
terms used in the 1983 Nicaragua dispute.98 By a simple, superficial 
comparison, it is clear that the panel here intended to act broadly, as it 
decided to “make such findings as will assist the DSB . . . .”99 However, 
in the United States—Nicaragua case, the panel intended to act with 
restraint, as its references explicitly omitted any discussion regarding 
Article XXI, stating, “that the Panel cannot examine or judge the 
validity of or motivation for the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii) by the 
United States.”100 
Regarding the requirements for invoking Article XXI, the 
Panel found “Russia has met the requirements for invoking Article 
XXI(b)(iii) in relation to the measures at issue.”101 However, the Panel’s 
conclusion is not the end-all, be-all for this case, nor for international 
relations and trade writ large. The Panel felt justified in upholding 
Russia’s Article XXI invocation because the “relations between 
Ukraine and Russia had deteriorated to such a degree that they were a 
matter of concern to the international community.”102 The Panel’s 
decision yields speculation that the United States might attack the 
strict definition of “war” and “emergency in international relations” 
under the GATT; it is important to stress that in this Russia case the 
WTO reached a conclusion antithetical to its extant history (including 
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history of Article XXI actions under the GATT).103 Speculation is 
abound that the United States might now contest the panel’s finding, 
“[w]ar refers to armed conflict.”104 Reasons for such an attack rely 
mostly upon the Nicaragua case, again, as the United States there was 
able to take Article XXI actions in a time when the United States 
deemed its national security was at risk. By defining the term “war,” 
the WTO has further limited the scope of Article XXI to legitimate 
armed conflict; any attempt to bring Article XXI actions would 
therefore require something like the Russia—Ukraine conflict, wherein 
there are legitimate boots on the ground and an armed annexation has 
occurred. Recalling the United States’ justification in the United 
States—Nicaragua conflict, wherein the United States stated that 
Nicaragua posed a threat to its national security with no further 
explanation, such an explanation could not pass muster today, given 
the Russia—Ukraine ruling’s constraints on Article XXI’s scope to 
wartime actions. 
Perhaps most confounding is that the WTO Panel’s decision 
categorically excludes economically costly trade wars.105 Given the 
current state of international trade—with the aforementioned Section 
232 tariffs causing much a stir—it is likely that this decision is reactive 
to the global status quo. Note, however, that this decision by the Panel 
will likely be appealed by Ukraine to the Appellate Body. Once there, 
the Appellate Body will have the ability to review all restrictive trade 
actions and state which ones it feels are justifiable under Article XXI 
and which it feels are not justifiable.106 As aforementioned, however, 
no decision by the Appellate Body has ever been overturned, due to 
the negative consensus requirement. That is not to say that the 
Appellate Body will not overturn the Panel’s decision—it is currently 
unknown at the time as to what the Appellate Body will do—but the 
Appellate Body’s final review will likely not itself be overturned. 
If the Appellate Body upholds the Panel’s findings, then it is 
clear that Article XXI has effectively been amended, and that any 
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amendment requires only one vote.107 While perhaps hyperbolic, the 
true issue is the continuing disagreements over national sovereignty 
that have plagued GATT and the WTO since their inception. 
Speculators and spectators alike believe that the United States is liable 
to withdraw from the WTO given an Appellate Body decision 
upholding the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit decision 
that is then likely to be upheld by one Ukrainian vote (at the least).108 
The United States has historically demonstrated concern regarding 
what it views as Appellate Body overreach; an aggressive stance by the 
Trump Administration on foreign trade, coupled with long-brewing 
discontent between the United States and the WTO means such a 
withdrawal is very possible in the near future.109 
Fears of United States voters turning against the WTO as a 
threat to national sovereignty and security have led to the theorization 
that a United States withdrawal from the WTO could mean 
permanent, immense tariff increases.110 Ironically, the very system 
designed to preserve and hierarchically manage international trade 
seems to have created such immense backlash that the twentieth-
century free trade system is now in jeopardy. Any willingness of the 
WTO Appellate Body “to rule on such a controversial topic risks 
destabilizing the entire rules-based system of international trade,” as 
one scholar has stated.111 Surely, such an opinion is not an 
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understatement given the magnitude of the Russia—Ukraine decision: 
on one hand lies national sovereignty, the right to self-realization, and 
Wilsonian self-determination of a sorts. On the other lies a system 
inherently tied together by the WTO in order to promote international 
comity, peace, and stability in trade and global economics. 
D. The Qatar—United Arab Emirates Conflict, and the 
Future of International Trade Conflicts Arising Under 
Article XXI 
The aforementioned Section 232 disputes are myriad. China, 
the European Union, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Turkey, Russia, India, 
and Switzerland have thus far taken a number and entered the line of 
complainants filing against the United States at the WTO.112 These are 
not the only claimants, but some of the larger countries airing their 
grievances against the United States. An escalating trade war with 
China, geopolitical posturing against Russia, uncertainty regarding 
Turkey, and tenuous relations with Western Europe seem to have 
escalated such that the WTO will have to review the United States’ 
Section 232 trade powers. As mentioned, these powers have existed—
and been used on-and-off—since the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was 
passed; an even longer precedent of some fifty-eight years is in 
question now. 
Akin to the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit 
decision, another Panel review has been initiated regarding a conflict 
between the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.113 The dispute, similar 
to Russia—Ukraine, centralizes around claims that Qatar has restricted 
imports from the United Arab Emirates.114 Since 2017, the United Arab 
Emirates has boycotted Qatar over allegations of institutional and 
governmental support for terrorism.115 Qatar has denied the charge, 
and the United Arab Emirates has claimed that Qatar’s response to the 
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boycott has been a ban on trade from the United Arab Emirates.116 
Qatar’s response has been to cite Article XXI of the GATT, suggesting 
that threats to national security have justified its trade restrictions on 
the United Arab Emirates.117 
The Qatar—United Arab Emirates situation is all too similar to 
the Russia—Ukraine problem: tensions are brewing over trade, with 
one larger country imposing trade restrictions on a smaller nation, 
with justification for their actions coming from Article XXI of GATT. 
As of August 2019, the United Arab Emirates agreed to drop its case 
against Qatar, in response to Qatar’s easing of trade measures enacted 
against the United Arab Emirates.118 Importantly, this news comes 
after—and likely as a result of—the Russia decision by the WTO. 
Qatar’s reasons for easing tensions are unknown officially, but it is not 
implausible to suggest that the changing tide of Article XXI decisions 
has raised caution among WTO member states seeking to enact trade 
restrictions. In the case of Qatar, it is again probable—but not known—
that the government, recognizing Russia’s pyrrhic victory in Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit acknowledged the polemic 
written by the WTO against a broad Article XXI. Therefore, 
understanding that its trade actions were likely no longer justifiable 
under the WTO’s new regime, Qatar likely dropped its restrictions, 
allowing the United Arab Emirates to thereafter drop its case. 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Writing in the early twentieth century, Oswald Spengler stood 
alone as a cynic among the optimistic attitude his compatriots shared 
entering the new century. Perhaps only Jan Gotlib Bloch—whose now-
famous treatises on the harms of mechanized warfare and the decline 
of international relations prior to the First World War—joins Spengler 
in sharing such an attitude. Spengler, however, crafted a theory of 
international relations and history characterized by an unnatural 
cyclical-ism. Noting the tendency of humans to repeat their follies, 
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Spengler assured his readers that the West was doomed and that the 
new, ever-globalizing order he saw slowly growing out of the 
Enlightenment was both dangerous and short-lived.119 
Others, including later historian Francis Fukayama, saw the 
Enlightenment and the latter twentieth century—which Spengler did 
not live to see—as instrumental in cementing the development of 
liberal democracy and free market globalism as the de facto world 
system, especially after the failures of Communism and Fascism.120 
Fukayama wrote famously that history had “ended” with the 1991 
collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc; free trade, he felt, would 
bring an era of prosperous, internationalized growth, while liberal 
democracies would replace totalitarian regimes and autocratic 
governance.121 
The truth lies somewhere in between the minds and ideas of 
these writers. On one hand, the international system has developed 
rapidly, with GATT evolving from a post-war solution to the 
rebuilding of Europe and the rest of the war-ravaged world to 
something of a permanent mainstay under the purview of the WTO. 
On the other, Spengler’s perhaps overly reactionary stance was not 
totally incorrect. The GATT’s 1947 recognition of national security as 
an inherently domestic and self-judging standard meant that future 
conflict would forever ensnare the GATT and its successors unless 
such a conflict were to be resolved. An international system built on 
hegemonized trade under the WTO cannot coexist with a domestically 
oriented system, catering to the whims of each WTO member state’s 
respective government. 
The future, while uncertain, seems to be suggestive of a move 
in two directions simultaneously—of an international body trying to 
appease Spengler by focusing on the national and Fukayama by 
focusing on the international. Such a situation is untenable. The 
Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case is representative of 
the culmination of thirty-six years of economic uncertainty; of a 
reunion between the supra-national and the national. At best, the 
future holds something of a middle ground—of a continued liberal 
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trade network held together by the WTO, promoting comity in 
international trade. At worst, the future presents a series of challenges 
to the international order, and a heavy shift towards internalized, 
domesticized governance and economics. 
